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Abstract
This essay presents a framework for analyzing political transition in 
postcommunist Central Asia by examining the legacies of both the traditional 
model of Central Asian societies in the prerevolutionary period and the political 
institutions under the Soviet regime. It argues that, although societies and the 
influences of traditional genealogical and familial identities persisted and the 
structure of societies remained unchanged under tsarist authority, kinship ties 
and networks were difficult for the Soviet state to control and firmly adapt to its 
institutions, despite the Soviet system’s attempt to eliminate these traditional 
social elements. The institutional legacies from both the precommunist 
and Soviet eras have continually affected nation building and subsequent 
development since Central Asian states gained their independence. Politics in 
Central Asia are currently characterized by neopatrimonialism, in which the 
authoritarian system serves as a formal institution, and behind it an informal, 
patron-client relationship can be observed. Therefore, regarding political 
transition in Central Asia, it is difficult to conclude that democratization has 
developed in Central Asian countries.
Keywords:  Central Asia, institutional legacy, neopatrimonialism, political 
transition.
 
Following two decades of reform, the five former Soviet republics in Central 
Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) 
have demonstrated that their commitment to democratization has been only 
a façade covering a resurgence of authoritarianism. The reality of political 
development in Central Asian states is no longer in line with the transition 
paradigm. The transition paradigm depicts the stages of democracy and is 
based on the decisions and abilities of political elites and the importance of 
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state institutions, especially the determinant role of elections. Accordingly, 
scholars are beginning to study the effects of institutional legacies on the 
political transition of the countries, which have not been emphasized in past 
explanations of the transition paradigm. However, scholars have differed 
in their perspectives regarding the role of institutional legacies in political 
transition in post-Soviet Central Asia.
One of these perspectives examines the traditional institutions of Central 
Asian societies, such as kinship, family, and ethnic ties, which play a major role 
in society and thereby provide useful criteria for exploring politics in Central 
Asia. This perspective contends that Central Asians resisted the Soviet regime 
through maintaining traditions, informal kinship networks, and “underground" 
Islamic practice. These forms of resistance were described as parallel 
structures through which both the Central Asian elites and masses deliberately 
circumvented the Soviet system. Therefore, Central Asian societies have been 
essentially unchanged since the pre-Soviet period.
Conversely, the other perspective of the Soviet legacy emphasizes 
the effect of the Soviet totalitarian regime on the political transition and 
development of post-Soviet Central Asia. Scholars argue that the processes of 
the Soviet administrative structure, economic specialization, and creation and 
expansion of national cadres transformed kinship connections into regional 
ties. This perspective therefore holds that post-Soviet governments have been 
established by elites with shared regional bases.1
This essay presents a framework for the analysis of political transition 
in postcommunist Central Asia by examining the legacies of both the 
traditional model of Central Asian societies in the prerevolutionary period 
and political institutions under the Soviet regime. As the terms “clan” and 
“tribe” “are heavily burdened with evolutionary assumptions of 19th-century 
theories,” according to Gullete, this essay will use the Russian terms rod for 
“clan” and plemya for “tribe.”2 Gullete noted that these Russian terms have 
been appropriated and are used in local discourse. In addition, both rod and 
plemya imply different forms of groupings on the basis of genealogical 
knowledge.3 These terms are prevalent, and they express individual and group 
identities. This essay argues that kinship ties and networks were difficult for 
the Soviet state to control and largely remained unaffected, despite Soviet 
1 These two perspectives are held, respectively, by Kathleen Collins and Pauline Jones Luong. See 
Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories,” 
World Politics, no. 2 (2004): 224-261; id., Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change 
and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2 David Gullette, “Theories on Central Asian Factionalism: The Debate in Political Science and Its 
Wider Applications,” Central Asian Survey, no. 3 (2007): 374.
3 Ibid., 383.
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attempts to eliminate these traditional social elements. This institutional 
legacy has continually affected nation building and subsequent development 
since Central Asian states gained independence. Politics in Central Asia are 
currently characterized by neopatrimonialism, in which formal institutions are 
characterized by an authoritarian system and a patron-client relationship can 
be observed in informal practice. Therefore, in the short term, it is difficult to 
develop a Western style of democracy in Central Asia.
Theoretical Discussion of Institutional Legacies and Political Transition
The neoinstitutionalism paradigm has received considerable attention from 
scholars amid the background of political transition and democratization 
in the postcommunist states during the 1990s. Numerous studies focus on 
institutional design and socioeconomic settings because they are considered 
fundamental variables for democratization. Perspectives differ as to whether a 
leader’s political will or institutional legacies dominate institutional design and 
policy decisions, particularly at critical junctures. For example, regarding the 
underlying factor of political will, Elster, Offe, and Preuss, as well as Johnson, 
have indicated that the collapse of communist regimes in 1989 created a social 
and political vacuum. At this critical juncture of discontinuous change, the 
institutional legacy as the foundation of dependency was weakened; thus, the 
possibilities for state policy decisions greatly expanded.4 Conversely, Shugart, 
Pop-Eleches, and Clare emphasize the role of historical legacies in shaping 
the political environment and newly formed institutions. They argue that any 
systematic analysis of democratization in the postcommunist context should 
be based on historical legacies. Although policy decisions are made rationally, 
the preferences and choices of politicians are largely the products of long- and 
short-term legacies.5
The above distinct perspectives indicate scholars’ attempts to determine 
the sufficient and necessary conditions for democratic development among 
the different cases of countries worldwide. However, the distinct outcomes of 
political transition in postcommunist countries over more than twenty years 
have revealed that different factors have existed and been influential within 
4 Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 296, and Juliet 
Johnson, “Path Contingency in Post-Communist Transformations,” Comparative Politics, no. 3 
(2001): 257.
5 Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Politicians, Parties, and Presidents: An Exploration of Post-
Authoritarian Institutional Design,” in Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative 
Perspectives on Democratic Transitions, ed. Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart (Berkeley: 
Regents of the University of California, 1997), 40-41; Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Historical Legacies 
and Post-Communist Regime Change,” Journal of Politics, no. 4 (2007): 909; and Joe Clare, 
“Democratization and International Conflict: The Impact of Institutional Legacies,” Journal of 
Peace Research, no. 3 (2007): 262.
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these countries. Accordingly, Johnson defined active institutional design and 
passive institutional design, in which institutional legacies exhibit differing 
influence and thus lead to distinct institutional outcomes. The success of active 
institutional design depends largely on a sufficient state capacity to achieve 
consensus, consistency, and credibility in policy implementation. From this 
perspective, institutional legacies constitute only one of numerous factors that 
affect a postcommunist state’s capacity, because, in active institutional design, 
“a policy choice replaces, creates, or alters an institutional framework through 
direct state efforts.”6
By contrast, policymakers attempt to use the passive design to incite others, 
such as supporters or like-minded people, to create or adapt institutions according 
to personal motivations, rather than changing institutional frameworks directly; 
for example, privatization in existing economic structures reduces state control 
over institutions without reconfiguring them. Therefore, in passive institutional 
design, the state acts as an indirect agent of change.7 To achieve successful 
outcomes, a passive design requires a favorable institutional context and, thus, 
institutional legacies exert a greater effect on this design. This is because the 
initial power relationships among actors are defined by institutional legacies; 
in other words, some actors have institutional advantages and are in a more 
favorable position than others to leverage opportunities during opportunities 
for change. Besides, implementing desired institutional changes is easier if 
they are based on and supported by the existing institutional context; hence, 
passive design policies are more appropriate and successful.8
The two aforementioned conditions-state capacity and institutional 
legacy-separately played an influential role in institutional change 
immediately following the collapse of communism, thus leading to different 
results. The relationship between these conditions and the democratization of 
postcommunist countries has been the focus of empirical studies, most of which 
underscore the strong connections between state capacity and democratization. 
For example, Elster, Offe, and Preuss focus on overcoming the social and 
political vacuum left by the collapse of the communist regimes since 1989. 
Through a comparative analysis of state capacities for constitution making, 
political parties, economic reform, social policy, and ideological change in 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, they contend that the 
formative impact of new institutions is the major determinant of democratic 
consolidation, which they define as the “capacity for self-consolidation through 
the sedimentation of the spirit of supportive orientations and attitudes, rather 
than the inert legacies of the past.”9
6 Johnson, “Path Contingency in Post-Communist Transformations,” 258.
7 Ibid..
8 Ibid., 260.
9 Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies, 296.
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Conversely, in contrast to countries in Central Eastern Europe, those of 
the former Soviet Union lacked truly independent statehood before and during 
the Soviet era and were largely governed by the central authority in Moscow; 
hence, the capabilities of these countries were more limited after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Therefore, while they simultaneously and rapidly began 
the process of transition at the juncture of an institutional vacuum and faced 
the challenges of intense domestic political, economic, and social disputes, the 
leaders of these countries tended to adopt familiar practice; that is, remedying 
the weakness via vertical power structures, thus hindering the attainment of 
democracy.10
Because of the weak and limited capabilities of an authoritarian state, 
institutional legacy is crucial to political transition. In short, successful 
democratic transition depends on effective state capacity. However, as Way 
suggests, “strong states...have translated into greater autocratic stability”;11 
effective and strong state capacity does not inevitably create democracy, 
despite being necessary for democracy. This has been demonstrated by some 
scholars using the J-curve to explain the relationship between state capacity 
and democratization. They find that democratic countries, on average, have 
higher-quality state capacities compared to weak democratic and strong 
authoritarian states. However, while democratization may weaken the state 
capacities of strongly authoritarian countries, it does not affect the capacity of 
moderate democratic countries.12
In countries that have transitioned more successfully than others, such 
as those in Central Eastern Europe, institutional legacies have been more 
favorable to democratization. For example, such countries were independent 
states prior to communist dominance, and, following the fall of communism, 
new political leaders were former opponents of communism who more actively 
promoted postcommunist reform.13 Central Eastern European countries, 
while under the control of Soviet rule, maintained local control over the state 
apparatus. Therefore, at the initial stage of transition, core institutions such 
as state administration, the treasury, the military, the police, and the courts, 
already were in place. Thus, Central Eastern European countries faced less 
10 Jessica Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in 
Post-Communist Countries,” Comparative Political Studies, no. 7 (2011): 906-907.
11 Lucan Way, “State Power and Autocratic Stability,” in The Politics of Transition in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus: Enduring Legacies and Emerging Challenges, ed. Amanda E. Wooden and 
Christoph H. Stefes (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 104.
12 Hanna Bäck and Axel Hadenius, “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped 
Relationship,” Governance, no. 1 (2008): 1-24; Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, 
“Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?” Studies of Comparative International 
Development, no. 4 (2011): 397-423; and Jorgen Moller and Svend-Eric Skaaning, “Stateness 
First?” Democratization, no. 1 (2011): 1-24.
13 Max Bader, “The Legacy of Empire: A Genealogy of Post-Soviet Election Laws,” Review of 
Central and East European Law 37 (2012): 453-454.
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severe challenges than countries of the former Soviet Union.14 It appears that 
some elements of legacy may play roles that are more crucial to supporting 
and facilitating state capacity toward the development of democracy in active 
institutional design.
Additionally, state capacity also appears to be important in passive 
institutional design, despite its emphasis on institutional legacy. A strong, or 
at least capable, state is indispensable to maintaining the stability of a regime. 
The stability of regimes in former Soviet states indicates the coercive state 
capacity created by political leaders in those states.15 As Pridham notes, 
although historical legacies are significantly influential in democratization, the 
democratic outcome cannot be predicted by historical legacies. “Their effects 
are usually qualified by the manner in which regime change occurred initially...
and above all how the subsequent transition is handled.”16 Accordingly, 
institutional design is constrained by the circumstances in which institutional 
legacy and state capacity interact. In other words, policymakers must quickly 
make decisions to respond to problems and challenges, while facing ambiguity 
and uncertainty of information and future outcomes at a critical juncture; 
consequently, both experience (institutional legacy) and current conditions or 
resources (state capacity) markedly influence decision making.
Not all points of view support strong state capacities in authoritarian 
regimes. Melville, Stukal, and Mironiuk note that postcommunist autocracies 
do not have high levels of state capacity or effective institutions, although they 
agree on a certain general trend of gradual growth in the state capacity of 
postcommunist countries. On the basis of the “king of the mountain" model,17 
they explain that the priorities of leaders of postcommunist nondemocracies 
are stability and preservation of the status quo, which translates to staying 
in power and maintaining vested interests and equilibrium in society. The 
most effective way for such leaders to ensure these aims is to interact with the 
elites and organizations that support them through economic and political rent 
rather than economic or political competition. Through the manipulation of 
formal institutions (e.g., through false elections, a dominant party, and the state 
apparatus), the problems of legitimacy, the loyalty to and support of leaders, 
and the potential for mass protest can be controlled. Moreover, because rent 
14 Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy?” 906.
15 Way, “State Power and Autocratic Stability,” 104, and Lucan Way, “Authoritarian State 
Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics 51 (2005): 250-251.
16 Geoffrey Pridham, “Post-Communist Democratizations and Historical Legacy Problems,” 
Central Europe, no. 1 (2014): 89.
17 This model shows a negative correlation between rent extraction (axis Y) and the quality of 
institutions (axis X) in post-Soviet nondemocracies. See Andrei Melville, Denis Stukal, and 
Mikhail Mironiuk, “ ‘King of the Mountain,’ or Why Postcommunist Autocracies Have Bad 
Institutions,” Russian Social Science Review, no. 4 (2014): 16-38.
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is generally redistributed along informal channels of patronage, developing 
effective institutions is unnecessary for achieving these aims.18
The above contention implies that the role of informal institutions is 
stronger than formal institutions. According to North, informal institutions 
are constraints related to “sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct” that-with formal rules including constitutions, laws, and property 
rights-compose the institutions that construct political, economic, and social 
interaction in society.19 In recent years, scholars such as Lauth, Helmke 
and Levitsky, and Grzymala-Busse have constructively proposed types of 
interaction between formal and informal institutions.20 They have considered 
the relationships between formal and informal institutions to be generally 
complementary, alternative, reconciliatory, undermining, or replacing.21 
However, focusing on only the interactions of formal and informal institutions 
is not helpful for determining how such activities affect the political transition, 
because they persist in all types of political systems: not only nondemocratic 
or transitional regimes but also liberal democracies. Through the example 
of a sports game, North illustrates the dynamics of informal institutions that 
underlie and supplement formal institutions. He contends that, in order to 
win, “some teams are successful as a consequence of constantly violating 
rules and thereby intimidating the opposing team. Whether that strategy pays 
off obviously depends on the effectiveness of monitoring and the severity of 
punishment.”22 Separating rules from the strategy of the players highlights the 
operational feature of informal institutions; that is, informal practice (which is 
the effect of players’ individual strategies of manipulating formal and informal 
rules) thus merges into patterns of group behavior.23 Accordingly, identifying 
these strategies of informal practice enables an understanding of how players 
achieve aims under existing constraints.24
The breakdown of the communist regime and the subsequent collapse 
18 Ibid., 31-33.
19 Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, no. 1 (1991): 97.
20 Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Best-Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal 
Institutions in Transitional Regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 
no. 3 (2010): 311-333; Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and 
Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” Working Paper 307 (September 2003), https://
www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/307.pdf (accessed September 19, 
2015); and Hans-Joachim Lauth, “Formal and Informal Institutions: Structuring Their Mutual 
Co-existence,” Romanian Journal of Political Science, no. 1 (2004): 66-88.
21 Rico Isaacs, “Nur Otan, Informal Networks and the Countering of Elite Instability in Kazakhstan: 
Bringing the ‘Formal’ Back In,” Europe-Asia Studies, no. 6 (2013): 1058-1059.
22 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Changes, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4-5.
23 Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet 
Politics and Business (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 20.
24 Ibid.
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of the Soviet Union intensified informal practices and the decline of formal 
institutions. However, informal institutions and their practices are not the 
product of the collapse of the communist regime; they existed during the late-
Soviet period because of the rigidity and incapacity of the centralized planning 
economic system.25 Currently, political and economic actors continue to 
adjust informally to the rapid changes of formal institutions and to overcome 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, while institutional legacy reduces transitional costs 
and fills the institutional vacuum, it leads to the construction of “slow and 
insider-dominated transitions” by formal institutions26 and, subsequently, to a 
pattern of “weak parties with a strong president.” In slow and insider-dominated 
transitions, insiders are mostly from old political apparatuses, or those whose 
standpoints between progovernment and opposition forces are vague. They 
guide transition typically by beginning careers in government or parliament, 
that is, by making pacts, thus demonstrating a type of transition without a clean 
break with the past or substantial personnel changes. The slow decomposition 
of old regimes not only leads them to seek methods to disassociate themselves 
from the previous regime but also provides to them economic interests from 
the old system.27 Such politicians are the least likely to represent a party with 
strong policy commitments to coordinate their activities; instead, they focus 
more on personal reputation than those in outsider-dominated transitions.
In the above context, rank-and-file politicians prefer to endow an executive, 
rather than party leadership, with the power to establish new policy directions, 
thus leading to electoral laws that provide the opportunity to campaign for 
personal votes and enable politicians to block or mitigate changes.28 This 
logic of transition defines the fundamental difference in political trajectories 
and outcomes between Latin American and Southern and Central European 
countries, and conversely, former Soviet Union countries. Countries in Latin 
America and Southern and Central Europe have experienced in the construction 
of the national state a certain level of rational bureaucratic transformation, 
whereas the countries of the former Soviet Union have not.29
In addition to influencing formal institutions, institutional legacy 
also affects informal institutions. This can be seen in the practice of 
25 Vladimir Gel’Man, “The Unrule of Law in the Making: The Politics of Informal Institution 
Building in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies, no. 7 (2004): 1024.
26 Shugart identifies two variables in explaining transitions for new democracies: the pace of 
the transition, and the dominant tendency among institutional designers, insiders versus 
outsiders. Primarily, members of the preexisting leadership or dominant party are insiders, and 
representatives of new political forces are outsiders. See Shugart, “Politicians, Parties, and 
Presidents,” 49.
27 Ibid.,74.
28 Ibid.,74-75.
29 Aleksandr Anatolyevich Fisun, “K Pereosmysleniyu Postsovetskoy Politiki: 
Neopatrimonial’naya Interpretatsiya” [Rethinking of post-Soviet politics: A neopatrimonial 
interpretation], Politicheskaya Kontseptologiya, no. 4 (2010): 160.
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neopatrimonialism, whereby political elites use state resources to gain loyalty. 
The practice of neopatrimonialism implies an interconnectedness of a political 
system with the formal institutions of a modern state (e.g., government 
ministries, and a legislative body) and informal patron-client relationships 
based on regional and kinship networks.30 The concept of neopatrimonialism 
is distinct from Max Weber’s traditional “patrimonialism,” which described 
how a ruler could establish legitimate authority by securing compliance from 
subjects.31 Patrimonialism represented a specific form of regime, stemming 
from a society’s loyalty to an individual; its legitimacy was derived from the 
voluntary obedience of people to the domination of their rulers. In contrast 
to patrimonialism, the patron-client relationships of neopatrimonialism 
repetitively function and form a hierarchy of dominance. Brokers in a 
neopatrimonial system mediate the exchange between subjects of the lower 
echelon and rulers of the upper echelon through a network of brokers or 
traditional patrons. Thus, the political center is linked with the countryside.32 In 
this well-constructed network of patron-client relationships, the ruler controls 
the political and economic life of the country. Individual cliental relationships 
with the ruler play a crucial role in accumulating personal wealth and in the 
rise and fall of the political elites.33
Therefore, the function of power in neopatrimonial regimes is unstable and 
unpredictable because exercise of power is not based on formal laws and rules. 
“Public norms under neopatrimonialism are formal and rational, but their social 
practice is often personal and informal.”34 Consequently, formal institutions 
such as elections, the judiciary, and constitutions are easily manipulated to 
favor the incumbent presidents. From this perspective, formal institutions 
with liberal democratic ideas are dominated by neopatrimonialism. This is 
essential for understanding the dynamics of post-Soviet regimes in this type 
of personalist-authoritarian regime. As Fisun argues, a neopatrimonial model 
compensates for the failures of modern nation-state building and unsuccessful 
rational-bureaucratic transformations.35
The collapse of the Soviet Union was a critical juncture of discontinuous 
institutional change for Central Asian countries. Because these countries lacked 
the state capacity to contend with the challenges of transition, the operation of 
informal institutions (which are mostly connected with legacies) exerted the 
30 David Lewis, “Understanding the Authoritarian State: Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia,” 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 19, no. 1 (2012): 116.
31 Fisun, “K Pereosmysleniyu Postsovetskoy Politiki” [Rethinking of post-Soviet politics], 161.
32 Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and 
Elaboration of an Elusive Concept,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, no. 1 (2007): 107.
33 Aleksandr Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” 
Demokratizatsiya, no. 2 (2012): 91.
34 Erdmann and Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered,” 114.
35 Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” 89-90.
102  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 12, No. 1
most influence on institutional change. Thus, a type of passive institutional 
design occurred, in which neopatrimonialism became the center of the political 
system. In this context, the main feature of neopatrimonialism is the patron-
client relationship as the informal mechanism and practice. Formal institutions, 
such as parliament, party system, and election, are permeated with and 
distorted by these informal practices. The consolidation of neopatrimonialism 
provides to Central Asian leaders a wide range of discretionary power as an 
instrument to restrain their “clients.” Neopatrimonialism is the institutional 
legacy generated not only from the Soviet era, but also by precommunist group 
hierarchy, kinship loyalty, and regional identities.
Institutional Legacies of Central Asia
Traditional Model of Central Asian Societies in the Pre-Soviet Period
Central Asia was populated mainly by races that were admixtures of Europeans, 
Mongols, and Iranians. Turkic migration began in the sixth century from 
the Mongolian Plateau or Altai Mountains, and Islam was introduced to the 
western part of Central Asia and the hinterlands of Transoxiana in the seventh 
century. While Central Asia was conquered by Arabs in the mid-eighth century, 
a mutual admixture and assimilation between Turkic people and the indigenous 
Transoxianans occurred. Most of Central Asia was settled by Turkic people 
by the tenth century. In the sixteenth century, two social types-nomadic and 
sedentary-further formed. Whereas the Uzbeks and Tajiks adopted sedentary 
lifestyles, groups in southwest Central Asia (Turkmen) and the inhabitants 
of the Asian steppe (Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) remained nomadic. In sedentary 
societies, a leader who claimed authority as a supra-premya leader ruled each 
khanate. The khanates incorporated all of the major ancient cities of Central 
Asia, and the peoples were contained within their borders. Conversely, whereas 
the nomadic periphery contained no great cities and was inhabited by groups 
of premya, they alternately invaded the khanates and served as mercenaries 
for the khans.36 Central Asia comprised three states in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries: the Bukhara Emirate, Khiva Khanate, and Kokand 
Khanate. These state-kingdoms were not established according to national 
boundaries of modern Central Asian republics.37
Through the Islamization of the Turkic khanate, a cultural system 
combining the traditional cultural characteristics of Turkic society and Islamic 
36 Andrew Phillips and Paul James, “National Identity between Tradition and Reflexive 
Modernization: The Contradictions of Central Asia,” National Identities, no. 1 (2001): 26-27.
37 Zubaidullo Ubaidulloev, “The Russian-Soviet Legacies in Reshaping the National Territories in 
Central Asia: A Catastrophic Case of Tajikistan,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, no. 6 (2015): 80, 
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366514000104/1-s2.0-S1879366514000104-main.pdf?_tid=965 
ac446-100d-11e5-bfef-00000aab0f01&acdnat=1434008804_67b5487a4e0ea9e3e2922b97199
3d911 (accessed June 9, 2015).
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law and ethics formed in Central Asia. However, Islamization did not result 
in a pure Islamic theocracy or caliphate such as in Arabia, nor did it create an 
ethnic empire united by Turkic-Islamic civilization. Before Russians arrived, 
areas in Central Asia possessed a rich heritage of historical monuments 
and functioned as eminent centers of Islamic learning. They refrained from 
interfering with traditional ways of life, which was in accordance with Islamic 
law and with the decrees issued by rulers in consultation with their cabinet. 
The ruler, emir, or khan ruled provinces through governors called beks or begs, 
who created laws.38 Succession of royalty was based primarily on kinship ties 
within rod and premya.
Russian colonization of Central Asia in the nineteenth century introduced 
Russian culture and modernization to the region. Although the Central Asian 
territories, newly invaded and occupied by tsarist Russia, “were organized 
according to the traditional Russian administrative system, which did 
not reflect historic, economic, and national specifics of the region,”39 the 
traditional social structure and Muslim identity were not completely altered 
because the Russian empire ruled indirectly, through small imperial outposts. 
The Russian government left native customs and institutions intact wherever 
possible, similar to how the emirates and khanates that encompassed parts of 
contemporary Central Asia did not undermine local native groups of rod and 
premya. In addition, emirates, like the Russians, often brokered feudal-like 
deals with these communities regarding tax collection or military support.40 
However, the 1886 Turkestan Statute by the Empire undermined the economic 
power of local native chiefs, changed property relations, and altered elections 
for administrative positions, creating a new class of local administrators. 
Wealthy merchants who were trained in the Russian language, technology, 
management, and navigation of the tsarist bureaucracy became interested in 
the development of economic ties and served as intermediaries between the 
Russian colonial regime and local Central Asian societies.41
The Russian government did not interfere with religion and related 
affairs in Central Asia. The Russian Orthodox Church served only the Slavic 
settlers at the Russian outposts and did not conduct missionary activities in 
the region. Islamic cultural and educational institutions were largely left intact 
by the Russian colonial administration. There were several reasons tsarist 
Russia implemented a noninterventionist policy regarding religion in Central 
38 Dilip Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran (New York: Overlook Duchworth, 2009), 
27-29.
39 Peter L. Roudik, The History of the Central Asian Republics (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2007), 77.
40 Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories,” 
World Politics, no. 2 (2004): 238.
41 Roudik, The History of the Central Asian Republics, 84-85.
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Asia. First, to legitimize the initial colonization to the new Islamic region in 
Central Asia, the Russian administration used repressive methods, yet actively 
cooperated with Muslim leaders as well, in support of goals for which there 
was mutual agreement, such as social peace.42 Therefore, the government 
pledged to uphold local religious leaders’ authority and Islamic institutions in 
exchange for their loyalty and that of the local people.
Second, tolerance toward Islam was a reflection of the traditionally 
suspicious and cautious attitude of Russian authority toward local societies. In 
addition to the official state religion of orthodox Christianity, all other beliefs 
were tolerated as long as they did not contradict state interests. Loyalty to 
the state system was the only requirement for all subjects, including Muslims. 
Therefore, the policy of nonintervention in Muslim affairs also reflected the 
Russian administration’s attempts to ignore Muslim institutions and downgrade 
their political influence.43 No religious dignitaries were appointed to positions 
of authority, and administrative positions filled by religious leaders were 
abolished. Individuals who were graduated from Islamic religious schools 
were not employed by government institutions because a civil education and 
knowledge of the Russian language were required.
Prior to the formation of the Soviet Union, no modern state bureaucracy 
or direct state rule existed in Central Asia, where states were not built on 
vertically integrated societies. The authorities ruled over the area through 
indirect administration and did not interfere with societies or the influences 
of local factions (e.g., Khan, Malek, Bey, Katkhoda, Aksaqal). In reality, 
the authorities had a vested interest in the diversity of rod and premya and 
in maintaining dominance in the competition among these local factions.44 
Because of the absence of definite national borders and the subsequent lack 
of national identity in Central Asia, attributes of rod and premya were major 
symbols of identity. Loyalty to kinship ties also prevented the delineation of 
borders and the formation of concepts of nationality. Although during the 1890s 
the notion of a pan-Turkic nation gained increasing traction and support among 
Central Asian intellectuals and elites, such nation-building attempts eventually 
failed. The emirs of the khanates could not accept the notion of a nation in 
the modern sense, and this conservatism was also in line with the interests of 
tsarist colonialism. In addition, elites’ contrasting opinions led to unsuccessful 
mobilization of anticolonial sentiment. In contrast to Europe, where modernity 
emerged gradually from tradition, in Central Asia, the collision of modernity 
and tradition were diffused by imperialist activities. This caused intellectuals 
and clerics to seek salvation in reconstituted variants of traditional identities, 
42 Ibid., 87.
43 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 53.
44 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia (New York: NYU Press, 2000), 10.
July 2016  |  105
such as pan-Turkists and pan-Islamists. However, rod and premya separatists 
of the steppes supported the continuation of tradition, rather than succumb to 
the modern European notion of nationalism.45
Soviet Legacy in Central Asia
The persistence of the traditional model of Central Asian societies was due to the 
role of informal institutions, in particular, the local factions of rod and premya 
during the Soviet Union period. As informal organizations, they consisted of 
a network of individuals linked by kinship bonds, and their members shared 
an organizational identity.46 However, the preexisting traditional social and 
cultural bonds were not completely preserved by the Soviet regime and its 
policies, but rather were fused into a new form of Soviet structures.47
The Soviet Union was a mechanism for nation building in Central Asia. 
Republics were created according to decrees issued between 1924 and 1936, 
which not only determined their frontiers and names but also reinvented pasts 
and languages. Despite an emphasis on the principles of equality and self-
determination of nationalities in the union framework, the Soviet policy did not 
create true nation-states or peoples, but rather administrative divisions as an 
initial stage in the formation of a “Soviet people.” Through its administrative 
territorial divisions, the Soviet regime attempted to destroy all forms of rod and 
premya links and to replace these traditional and informal networks with more 
modern forms of social organization; however, such attempts reinforced the 
local identities in Central Asia. On the basis of real and perceived distinctions 
among the newly formed titular nationalities, territorial divisions intensified 
the historical cleavage structures among these Soviet republics in Central Asia. 
Several rod within the same premya might have been enclosed by boundaries 
of oblast (region) that did not completely correspond with the preexisting 
boundary of the premya or with local identities.48 In addition, while preserving 
some preexisting rod and premya, the system of administrative boundaries 
also preserved inherent patronage networks in a new form. The traditional 
political and economic authority of premya and local leaders was replaced by 
the first secretary of an obkom (regional party committee), who represented the 
chief executive of a particular territory and had the power to allocate various 
resources at regional and local levels. As the primary dispenser of political and 
economic resources, an obkom first secretary “skillfully used this position to 
build loyalty and support throughout his oblast.”49
Collectivization enforced from 1928 consolidated labor and individual 
45 Phillips and James, “National Identity between Tradition and Reflexive Modernization,” 28.
46 Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 231.
47 Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia, 63.
48 Ibid., 65-67.
49 Ibid.
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land into kolkhozy (collective farms) or sovkhozy (state farms). In this Soviet 
system, social existence, including the availability of basic social services and 
the right to housing and travel, was based on belonging to and identifying with 
a collective. However, the creation of kolkhozy, which tended to be based on 
local villages, resulted in a syncretic fusion of the premya or rod structure 
and agricultural production units.50 As Roy argued, because lineages of rod 
and premya were often integrated into kolkhozy as individual brigades,51 the 
cores of kinship structures, such as qawm (solidarity networks) or mahalla 
(the neighborhood community), were not completely destroyed by Sovietism. 
The kombedy (committees of poor peasants), which were formed for social 
functions and control of the collective farms at the local level, were “merely 
the renamed qishloq (rural settlements), aul (village), or mahallakomiteti 
(village or neighborhood committee)”; in other words, the local village elders 
informally played the same role as governor of their communities as before.52 
Although the authorities exerted efforts to concentrate the number of kolkhozy, 
and thus regroup sovkhozy to break and transform the structure of traditional 
life and kinship, the pre-Soviet groupings such as rod and premya suited the 
new institutional conditions. The former kolkhoz facilitated the formation of 
the new sovkhoz, thus forming a new group similar to premya, while preserving 
their specific identities.53
Because traditional kinship structures were preserved, the daily practice of 
religion, an integral part of people’s lives in Central Asia, could continue largely 
without interruption. This, despite the atheistic and antireligious ideologies of 
communism and the destructive Soviet policy regarding Islam. Moreover, the 
adaptability of the clerical structure of the Sunni branch of Islam to the Soviet 
system helped it to avoid destruction. For example, imams could be selected 
by the local population, and all rituals, from prayers to funerals, could be held 
at home. Therefore, religious culture and activities were retained, together 
with rod and premya lineages, within villages, mahalla, or kolkhoz. As Glenn 
notes, the fact that Central Asia was distinguished by an extremely low rate 
of population movement from local rural environments to urban centers also 
meant that these practices could continue unreported because each inhabitant’s 
loyalty remained at the local level.54
The korenizatsiya (the nativization and indigenization of local elites) of 
the early Soviet nationality policy, promoted primarily in the 1920s, also led 
the traditional kinship groups to accommodate Soviet institutions. To fight the 
backwardness of Central Asia and resolve the problem of the lack of party 
50 John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 96.
51 Roy, The New Central Asia, 87.
52 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 87.
53 Roy, The New Central Asia, 86-90.
54 Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, 89.
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cadres after the communist revolution, the Soviet regime assigned power 
to native elites to restructure the new Soviet republics. Through the process 
of korenizatsiya, natives were involved in Sovietized institutions, namely 
governmental and educational systems. Meanwhile, because populations of 
ethnic Russians who were ordered to migrate to Central Asia were typically 
technical cadres, they were concentrated in industrial centers and urban areas; 
institutions in rural areas were ruled by native staffs.55 As a result, party cadres 
originated in districts, and links with the kolkhoz remained strong. Additionally, 
personnel in the Communist Party, government organizations, and industry 
were recruited through kinship ties. The native cadres of the district or regional 
committees placed members of their rod and premya in positions because they 
considered kinship ties to be more reliable for surviving in competitive and 
hierarchical party power struggles.56
Personnel recruitment based on kinship ties occurred in institutional 
hierarchies at both the local level and the highest tiers of authority, as well as 
within in the party structure.57 The highest Communist Party posts in Soviet 
republics, including the post of first secretary, were occupied by natives or the 
traditional leading groups in the newly formed nations. In Kazakhstan, the 
Senior jüz (hordes), from the southeast of the country, held influential positions 
within the political apparatus. In Kyrgyzstan, two major groups, Salto and Sary 
Bagish, were the traditionally predominant military and political powers. The 
hegemony of elites from the Khozhent region of Tajikistan from 1946 to 1992 
demonstrated that they were trusted by Moscow. In Turkmenistan, Teke held 
power, whereas in Uzbekistan, a Tashkent-Ferghana regional alliance held 
power from 1937 to 1959, when the hegemony was ended by a Samarkand-
Bukharan alliance.58
In addition, patron-client relationships were established among key 
members of the political apparatus in Moscow (including the general secretary 
after 1937) and the leaders of the republics. Although the cadres were loyal 
to the Soviet system and maintained power with the support of Moscow, 
the central powers in Moscow “rapidly settled for manipulating political 
factionalism, either by supporting one faction against another or by maintaining 
a balance between them.”59 During the 1920s and 1930s, Moscow attempted 
to suppress such locally based political networks in the region. However, soon 
after Stalin’s death, Moscow allowed them free rein, as long as they exerted the 
economic production and social control that the Communist Party demanded 
55 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 91.
56 Alexandra Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: 
Croom Helm, 1983), 136, quoted in Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, 97.
57 Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia, 71.
58 Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, 97.
59 Roy, The New Central Asia, 103-104.
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of all republics.60 Thus, Moscow acted as a referee to balance these divergent 
interests, and each faction strived to gain and maintain support from Moscow. 
Strong local leaders, such as Rashidov in Uzbekistan, Usubaliev in Kyrgyzstan, 
Kunaev in Kazakhstan, Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Gapurov in Turkmenistan, and 
Rasulov in Tajikistan, were backed by the central authority because the local 
power brokers supported them.61
After 1938, a two-tier policy was introduced in Central Asia that allowed 
dual societies to exist. The upper tier consisted of the Russified urban centers 
where Russian culture and language predominated. Any Central Asian elite 
wishing to be promoted to the higher echelons of Soviet institutions was 
required to be fluent in Russian and, ostensibly at least, to demonstrate his 
communist credentials. Conversely, the lower tier consisted of regions 
retaining traditional ways of life, which included the traditional social and 
religious positions, as well as the hierarchies of rod and premya in the newly 
formed nations.62
Political Transition in Central Asia
After their independence, Central Asian republics started the process of 
transition. Between 1992 and 1994, the five countries adopted constitutions 
that met the basic principles of democracy. However, transition in the region 
has not been as expected. Most of the regimes are considered to exhibit a 
democratic façade that conceals authoritarian rule. According to Freedom 
House, Kyrgyzstan has been a partially free country because of its additional 
reforms after the two revolutions in 2005 and 2010. By contrast, Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan have not been free countries for many years, and, in 2015, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were the least free countries.63 Nondemocratic 
political transition was a rational choice for Central Asian elites “who actually 
did not, for the most part, view their states as being ‘in transition’ from an 
oppressive Soviet past to a democratic future.”64 However, as mentioned, 
for countries without democratic experience or the capacity to resolve 
problems of transition, the role of informal institutions was extended. Due 
to the combination of authoritarian presidencies and clientelism, the political 
transition of postcommunist Central Asian countries is characterized by 
neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism emphasizes personal rule, rather than 
60 S. Frederick Starr, Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia (Uppsala, 
Sweden: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program-A Joint Transatlantic 
Research and Policy Center, 2006), 8.
61 Ibid.
62 Donald S. Carlisle, “Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks,” Problems of Communism 40, no. 5 (1991), 
quoted in John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 98.
63 Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/ (accessed May 1, 2015).
64 Lewis, “Understanding the Authoritarian State,” 116.
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rule of law, and promotes patron-client relationships. As a result, it leads to 
embezzlement of state resources, a feudal-type relationship between the central 
leader and the local elites, and a “model of center-periphery relations.”65 In 
other words, neopatrimonialism corresponds with authoritarian politics.
Passive Institutional Design
Although the constitutions in each of the five Central Asian countries divide 
powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, 
in reality, authoritarianism has been an entrenched practice. The first elected 
presidents in these countries, except Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, were 
former top leaders of the Communist Party. They dominated the constitutional 
processes, sought to accumulate power, and gained direct control of the 
executive office.
The choice of presidential-style authoritarianism, which is partly the 
result of a Soviet legacy of strong leadership, also exhibits a preference for an 
individual to symbolize and represent the polity.66 Additionally, by creating 
a presidential system, the costs of manipulation are lower. In contrast to the 
parliamentary system, in which the high number of elections of members of 
parliament renders manipulating the outcome more difficult, in a presidential 
system, it is easy to ensure reelection for the president because only one 
election is held every five or seven years.67 Presidentialism can be reinforced 
by legal reforms, as well as by other mechanisms such as elections, referenda, 
and amendments to constitutions for extensions of terms of office, thereby 
creating plebiscitary regimes.68 By manipulating these institutions through 
leveraging incumbency advantage, a favorable environment is created. Thus, 
it is common for an incumbent to receive more than 90 percent of the votes, 
and voter turnout is typically high.
Through constitutional amendments or the manipulation of election laws 
and regulations, long tenures of the Central Asian leaders have been achieved. 
President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and President Karimov of Uzbekistan 
were elected in December 1991, following ethnic rioting in both republics. 
In 2015, both were reelected for additional five-year terms, after gaining 
overwhelming support of more than 90 percent of the voters in presidential 
elections.69 Indeed, for leaders in Central Asia, it is unnecessary to hold 
65 Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” 89.
66 Sally N. Cummings, Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations 
(Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 66.
67 Sherzod Abdukadirov, “The Failure of Presidentialism in Central Asia,” Journal of Political 
Science 17, no. 3 (2009): 290.
68 Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian 
Context,” 310.
69 Islam Karimov won the March 29 election with 90.4 percent of the vote on a 91.1 percent 
turnout in 2015. Nazarbayev had a crushing election victory, with results showing that he won 
97.7 percent of the vote. See “Presidential Elections: Preliminary Results Announced,” Central 
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elections according to a fixed schedule; the date can be changed with any 
“righteous” pretext. The March 29, 2015 presidential election was the second 
occasion on which Uzbekistan held a presidential election long after its 
leader’s term had expired. In Kazakhstan, elections have been held earlier than 
the end of the presidential term three times. The ostensible reasons for holding 
the 2015 election early were a “growing economic crisis” and “heightening 
geopolitical tension.” This allowed Nazarbayev to compete with opponents 
who were unprepared.70
Similar situations have occurred in other Central Asian countries. 
Constitutional changes in Tajikistan in 1999 and 2006 and a referendum in 
2003 allowed Rahmon to run for additional consecutive seven-year terms. 
Thus, in autumn 2013, he won a fourth consecutive term. Niyazov, the former 
first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, was elected president 
in October 1990, and reelected unopposed, receiving 99.5 percent of the votes 
in June 1992. After a referendum in January 1994 extended Niyazov’s term 
of office to 2002, in December 1999, a resolution of the People’s Council of 
Turkmenistan effectively rendered him president for life.
Central Asian leaders prioritized retaining control of power over obeying 
formal laws. Immediately after Niyazov’s death in 2006, Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov, who was not a legal successor to Niyazov, according 
to the constitution, gained the backing of the powerful security council and 
engaged in a political battle with the chairman of parliament to become 
the acting president. The Kyrgyz ex-president, Askar Akayev, also retained 
control of the government after independence. While the economy worsened, 
Akayev’s governance became more authoritarian. Thereafter, years of ongoing 
conflict with parliament caused Akayev to hold a referendum seeking support 
directly from the public, including constitutional amendments in February 
1996 and October 1998 to expand presidential powers and change election 
rules. Although the Tulip Revolution in 2005 forced Akayev out of office, his 
successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, did not improve the situation. Violent upheaval 
in 2010 led to constitutional reform, through which the powers of parliament 
were increased and the role of the president was reduced. In December 2011, 
the pro-Russian candidate, Almazbek Atambayev, was elected to office. 
Despite the 2010 constitutional reforms aimed at preventing the resurgence 
of the superpresidential system, Atambayev successfully acquired all political 
power. The judiciary is still not independent and remains dominated by the 
Election Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, http://www.elections.uz/en/events/
current_topics/5558/ (accessed June 5, 2015), and “Preliminary Results of Early Election of the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Held on 26 April 2015,” Central Election Commission 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, http://election.kz/portal/page?_pageid=153,2281087&_
dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (accessed June 5, 2015).
70 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Five Ways to Stay in Power in Central Asia,” BBC News, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-31705746 (accessed June 5, 2015).
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executive branch.71
Maintaining power cannot be accomplished by the president alone. The 
executive needs support from other formal institutions to maintain patron-
client relationships. Establishing a stable and less competitive playing field is 
crucial for the existence of proregime parties. In Central Asia, proregime parties 
include parties of power and satellite parties.72 With the support of proregime 
parties, not only is the legitimacy and power of the president more consolidated, 
but also oppositional forces can be controlled and further integrated into the 
patronage network.73 Additionally, although the proregime party dominates in 
parliament, it enlarges the role of the president in legislative exercise of power. 
This facilitates the possibility of successful and “legal" informal manipulation. 
Conversely, by associating themselves with the president, proregime parties 
more easily access state or private resources, which helps them to distort the 
playing field and win elections, thus becoming dominant in parliament.74 
Therefore, party politics in Central Asia is not based on party ideology or party 
programs (i.e., policy seeking), but rather on vote seeking and office seeking.75
The proregime parties in Central Asia, with their overwhelmingly majority 
of seats in parliament, have caused the legislatures to become rubber stamps for 
the ruling authorities; the legislatures do not play an opposing or monitoring 
role. The president’s Nur Otan party in Kazakhstan won all of the parliamentary 
seats in the lower house (Majilis) in 2007. Although in the 2011 election 
the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Bright Path won eight seats, and the 
Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan won seven seats, Nur Otan still held 
eighty-three seats (81 percent). Hence, the situation of one-party dominance 
did not change.76 Tajikistan’s proregime People’s Democratic Party gained 65.4 
percent of the vote in the March 2015 parliamentary elections, and won fifty-
one of the sixty-three seats in the lower chamber, Assembly of Representatives 
(Majlisi namoyandagon).77 In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which do not have 
true multiparty systems, parliament is dominated entirely by propresidential 
71 Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/kyrgyzstan (accessed 
September 25, 2015).
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75 Ibid.
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and proregime parties. In Kyrgyzstan, which has a more developed multiparty 
system than other countries in Central Asia, parliamentary seats were held by 
five parties before October 2015. Thus, a coalition government was formed 
by the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), Ar-Namys, and Ata-
Meken.78 The president’s party, SDPK, with its privileged access to state 
resources, was helped by the state broadcaster, Kyrgyz Teleradio Company 
(KTRK), during the election campaign in the October 2015 elections in an 
attempt to influence the voting outcome.79
Although most Western research institutes and analysts contest the 
fairness of the electoral process and the OSCE frequently reports violations of 
fair elections, governments in Central Asia never question the fairness of their 
elections and dispute the existence of irregularities. When Central Asian leaders 
discuss democracy, they often argue that the historical development of Central 
Asia differs from that of other regions and that Central Asian values cannot 
be compared with Western values. Similar to most Asian countries, Central 
Asian states assert that they must be carefully examined in the context of the 
historical, cultural, social, and political experiences of each country.80 Thus, 
democracy must be in line with the unique characteristics of these civilizations 
and societies.81 This idea is closely linked to the negative connotation and 
uncertainty of democracy and capitalism experienced during the 1990s, and 
implies that strong leadership and social stability are necessary. An emphasis 
on history and traditional culture not only filled the ideological vacuum when 
communism failed, but also legitimized authoritarianism and the political, 
economic, and social interaction in various fields of informal functioning.
Patron-Clientelism as a Routinized Informal Practice
Adherence to tradition assists authoritarian rulers in assuming a dominant role 
over the state and legitimizes power so that the paternalism of the state over 
society and individuals is ensured.82 In this circumstance, state governance is 
not based on legal legitimacy, but instead seeks to establish “rule of man” and 
profit from rents in exchange for the protection of individual or group interests. 
As Laruelle noted, “there is no distinction between office and officeholder: 
subordination to a position is the same as being subordinate to a man, and 
78 Zhogorku Kenesh Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki [Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz Republic], http://
www.kenesh.kg/RU/Articles/15411-Stanovlenie_kyrgyzskogo_parlamenta.aspx (accessed 
June 9, 2015).
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www.eurasianet.org/node/75281 (accessed October 1, 2015).
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(2012): 80.
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bureaucrats have a kind of property right over their position... . Once the boss 
departs, contracts must be renegotiated with his successor.”83 Therefore, the 
establishment of networks as social safety nets is necessary, because such 
private connection adjustments are allowed under uncertain and unreliable 
governance and by public services.
Governance in Central Asia is typically based on informal rules and 
patron-client networks in which kinship and regional loyalties are crucial. 
Numerous other types of connections, including relationships of family, 
friendship, work, and education, also are important to patron-client networks. 
A president’s widespread informal power distribution causes personal loyalty 
to overtake rational and objective law, implying that loyalty to a president is 
more important than loyalty to institutions. Accordingly, the political dynamic 
of the patron-client relationship in each country is between the president 
and the groups of elites that dominate family groups and regional networks, 
and elites who control sectors of the economy.84 The first group of elites is 
mostly defined by kinship ties. Members of genealogical networks have long 
memories, and most of them know their lineage affiliation. Because rulers in 
Central Asia originate from influential familial networks, traditional kinship 
ties should be accounted for when people are appointed to administrative posts 
at various levels. Presidents cannot ignore this condition because they must 
mediate and maintain a balance among various forces from different familial 
or kinship networks.85 In addition, the members of a president’s family are 
predominant over a country’s political and economic power, a condition that 
is one of the transitional characteristics of post-Soviet Central Asia. Through 
family networks, presidents establish loyal groups, while political resources 
provide necessary political patronage for expanding family influence to ensure 
long-term interests in ruling.
The second group of elites comprises regional networks. These elites are 
influential not only because of their close economic and political ties but also 
because they frequently reflect the diverse power centers that have developed 
in previous centuries.86 For example, many historically prestigious local 
leaders and Soviet republic officials were from the Tashkent, Samarkand, and 
Fergana regions in Uzbekistan, the Khujand region of Tajikistan, the Senior 
jüz within southeastern and southern Kazakhstan, and the northern Kyrgyzstan 
Chu and Talas regions. Political elites from these regions in modern Central 
Asian regimes still play crucial roles; some of them have entered the state 
power system, becoming dominant local political forces. Moreover, because 
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regional elites occupy a key intermediate level of authority, they are frequently 
in contact with local power brokers as well as with the central government, 
and therefore can advance their personal political careers and direct public 
subsidies or obtain financing for large infrastructure projects. Therefore, 
regional elites are powerful, and the relationship between them and central 
executive elites is not always top-down and unidirectional.87
The third group in the patron-client relationship consists of the elites 
who control sectors of the economy (e.g., cotton, power, mineral extraction, 
construction, transportation) in Central Asia. Although, according to Starr, 
they reflect the emirs’ control of irrigation systems in the pre-Soviet period, 
the power of these oligarchs can be traced to the Soviet period.88 As in Russia, 
oligarchs in Central Asia made their fortunes during the reckless privatization 
of the early 1990s, “when they were the managers of the main privatization 
funds; or later with the emergence of new economic and financial riches, such 
as in the banking sector.”89 The oligarchs try to establish close connections 
and relationships with those in decision-making circles. Without favors from 
higher levels of authority, oligarchs are unable to function. Moreover, in 
addition to their own market-based competition, some of the oligarchs have 
adopted specific strategies of competition with the presidential family; others 
have formed partnerships with the patronage networks of the state.90
All these familial, regional, and oligarchic elites collaborate with the 
president to form a mutually dependent structure in which the president 
depends on elites for legitimacy and to implement decisions, while elites 
acquire favor from the president in the form of access to state resources and 
positions within the governance structure. Regarding this relationship, Hale 
provides a detailed description:
The patronal president has a decided advantage in that the 
elites must act collectively if they are to use the president’s 
dependence on them to challenge that president. The 
presidency, by contrast, is an institutionalized focal point 
for collective elite action that can be directed against those 
elites who might stick their necks out in order to organize a 
collective challenge to the president. Officials in lower-level 
state positions of authority, for example, will be reluctant to 
use these positions to challenge the president for fear that 
87 Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian 
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they could lose their jobs (or worse) if not enough other elites 
go along with them. Leaders in the business community 
also have incentives to use their financial or media assets to 
support (or at least not undermine) the president’s political 
agenda so as to avoid the risk that presidential resources will 
be directed against their business interests in retaliation.91
Diversity of the Neopatrimolialism in Central Asia
Although the political transition and development in Central Asia generally 
has been characterized by neopatrimonialism, its practice has not been 
uniform. The intensity of the competition among elites and the ruler’s ability 
to balance or control this competition vary across the states. The first type 
of neopatrimonialism involves a strong president whose family generally 
comprises the most powerful patrons who command the most extensive 
networks. In this model, the “clients” mostly comprise the strata of oligarchic 
or regional elites who fiercely compete for rent-seeking opportunities. Both 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are included in this type.
Since independence, Nazarbaev has constructed a political pyramid, on 
top of which is the president who controls the chains of political and economic 
dependence. While elite groups below have fought among themselves for 
power and favors, his role as mediator between groups has signified that he 
must maintain the equilibrium of the system. This balance was threatened 
by members of Nazarbaev’s family who control the domestic media, energy 
sector, and housing market and who caused a crisis within the elite structure 
in 2001. The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), which later became 
the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Bright Path (Ak Zhol), was created by 
members of the government and the political and economic elites who were 
seriously concerned about Nazarbayev and his family’s increasing control of 
the country’s wealth.92 Although the emergence of the counterelites compelled 
the presidential administration to embark on political reform, it also made the 
authorities aware that the growing economic power possessed by the oligarchs 
might encourage their political autonomy and ambition. This, in turn, could 
threaten both the president’s power and his family’s role as an economic actor.93
In response to the emergence of oppositional forces, Nazarbaev became 
committed to a process of political reform, but the political initiative was 
totally defined and shaped by Nazarbaev on his own terms. The president 
established the National Commission for Democratization and Civil Society 
91 Henry Hale, “Regime Cycles, Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” 
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in 2004 to continue the process of political reform. However, because the 
core of Kazakh politics is always represented by the president, presidential 
administration monopolizes the Commission. The dialog, therefore, was not 
meaningful, even though the opposition parties, such as DCK, Ak Zhol, and the 
Communist Party were invited. The opposition understood that participating in 
the Commission for “reform” was merely to “associate, and to be seen as being 
sympathetic and constructive with the president and implicit in supporting the 
direction of the president’s reforms.”94 After contending with the DCK, the 
proregime party, Nur Otan, represented the interests of the president. The Asar 
Party, created under the leadership of the president’s daughter to assemble 
young, loyal elites, was merged with Nur Otan.95 Because the authority of 
the president depends on his ability to distribute resources among different 
networks, Nur Otan has proved an effective mechanism for integrating state 
elites with citizens employed in the state apparatus, thereby providing support 
and stability for Nazarbayev’s regime.96 Nur Otan acts as a formal institution 
to stabilize the unstable nature of competition among informal networks. The 
efforts of President Nazarbaev have resulted in Kazakhstan’s becoming an 
authoritarian one-party regime.
In contrast to Kazakhstan, which started under quite favorable conditions, 
Tajikistan has departed from communism under conditions of large-scale 
conflicts, which consequently brought about the civil war from 1992 to 1997. 
The war was ended by signing an armistice agreement under the auspices 
of the United Nations. Initially, Tajikistan was expected to develop the 
representative, multiparty democracy that was envisioned in the 1997 peace 
agreement. However, because the powers of Rahmon’s government have 
increased and new elites have emerged, the pressure from the government has 
constricted the political space for the development of oppositional forces.97 
In particular, in 2001 and 2002, the government began reversing United Tajik 
Opposition appointments, of which, according to the 1997 peace agreement, 
there is a 30 percent quota for levels of government.98 While Rahmon 
suppressed rival political groups, he simultaneously held the power in his 
own grip and established patron-client networks consisting of his own family 
and officials from his home region of Danghara. Rahmon’s family holds 
several governmental posts of diverse political importance; owns businesses 
in transportation, construction materials, and food production; and controls 
94 Isaacs, “Managing Dissent, Limiting Risk and Consolidating Power,” 19-20.
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imports and exports. Meanwhile, poverty is widespread in the country, and 
many people have been forced to migrate to Russia to work as laborers for 
economic survival.99
Relying on his political advantage, Rahmon won elections in 1999 and 
2006, and successfully amended the constitution in 1999 and 2003 to allow 
him to stay in power until 2020.100 Additionally, the People’s Democratic 
Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) has been dominant in the national parliament. In 
the 2015 election, the PDPT gained fifty-one of sixty-three seats, whereas the 
Agrarian Party and the Party of Economic Reforms, respectively, won five 
seats and three seats, with one seat for the Socialist Party and two seats for the 
Communist Party of Tajikistan.101 The dominance of the PDPT in parliament 
has been considered a rubber stamp for the Rahmon government, while the 
oppositional forces steadily have been neutralized in government.102 They are 
either moderate and thus able to sustain small segments of power-sharing in 
parliament, such as the Agrarian Party and the Party of Economic Reforms, or 
completely excluded from parliament, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party 
and Social Democratic Party.
The second type of neopatrimonialism entails a strong president 
representing powerful patrons and commanding extensive networks, but with 
less transparent and intense internetwork competition than in the first type. 
The comparatively limited competition is due in part to greater concentration 
of wealth. Additionally, power is more highly concentrated and there is 
unrestrained personal rulership, both of which are inherited entirely from the 
Soviet era. This type of neopatrimonialism is exhibited in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. Some scholars use “sultanistic neopatrimonialism" to describe 
regimes within the two countries, thus emphasizing the extreme degree of the 
ruler’s personal power. Under the pervasive power of the ruler, opposition is 
not allowed to exist. Any individuals with power inside the state apparatus 
represent only the interests of the ruler.103 However, this description has 
been unable to properly explain the development of these two countries. In 
Uzbekistan, the Karimov family is unlikely to win public support or succeed 
President Karimov; however, the security organs are increasingly taking control 
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of the country.104 In Turkmenistan, Berdymukhamedov’s rule has moved away 
from the sultanism of the Niyazov era, with some changes to a neopatrimonial 
system similar to those of Turkmenistan’s Central Asian neighbors.
The regional factions and their political representatives in Uzbekistan 
substantially influence the balance of power in the country. Karimov has 
denounced regionalism and refers to it as one of the most important threats to 
the country’s security. Though he has not liquidated the regional factions, he has 
eliminated the influence of some of the powerful regional elites around him.105 
By playing factions against each other and concentrating financial capital in 
the hands of the central government under the president’s personal control, 
Karimov has strengthened his power and considerably diminished the influence 
of regional factions. Moreover, to prevent elites from accumulating excessive 
power, Karimov frequently has used a policy of rotation and institutionalized 
direct appointment of regional governors (khokims).106 Consequently, while 
interelite competition is less regionally based than previously, a new type of 
patronage network has emerged around key administrative departments in the 
central government.107 It is also the tactic of Karimov to instill competition 
between these agencies as a means of balancing power. The fiercest competition 
has taken place between the Interior Ministry and the National Security 
Service, implying conflict between two politicians with their own regional 
support: Samarkand’s Zakir Almatov and Tashkent’s Rustam Inoyatov.108
Despite the Karimov family’s having dominated Uzbek economic power 
since the 1990s, including the copper, construction, finance, catering, and 
entertainment industries, it does not have as strong a grasp on power networks 
as the Nazarbayev family in Kazakhstan. The president’s eldest daughter, 
Gulnara Karimova, is quite active in striving for political influence and even 
the presidency after Karimov’s departure. However, her violation of both 
national and European laws in domestic and foreign business transactions, as 
well other improper behaviors, have undermined Uzbekistan’s image. This has 
led to familial conflict, as well as lost domestic support. Gulnara Karimova’s 
failure highlights the role of Inoyatov, the National Security Service chief, 
who acts as both the protector of national security and the defender of the 
president’s reputation and popularity. However, Inoyatov does not merely 
execute the president’s orders; he has done his best to become completely 
indispensable to his patron, Karimov. His low profile and loyalty to Karimov 
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have earned him the president’s trust, while obscuring his ambition to hold 
the presidential post.109 The role of Inoyatov in the patron-client networks 
suggests that security organs likely will become a key player during the power 
transition in Uzbekistan.
In Turkmenistan, Niyazov was the first secretary under the Soviet Union. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the position was no longer 
constrained by the central government in Moscow. As Niyazov controlled 
key formal and informal factors of power, especially the Soviet repressive 
apparatus-which he used to eliminate other power centers that might 
challenge the regime-he created and consolidated an extreme dictatorship.110 
In contrast to other Central Asian presidents whose families are typically 
closely connected to particular regional or kinship networks, Niyazov built 
his rule mostly on the basis of personal loyalties or patronage linkages with 
the office of the president. This is due largely to the fact that, as an orphan, he 
had a less exentive kinship network, and, unlike the children of presidents in 
other states, Niyazov’s children were uninterested in politics.111 Because direct 
loyalty to the president appeared to be the main criterion for promotion up 
the hierarchy, a cult-like and sycophantic culture emerged among the political 
elites who competed with and fought against each other. Niyazov’s power 
and position could thereby rise alone above all of these groups and became 
invincible.
In summary, patronage groups created on the basis of competing kinship 
and regional networks were not adequately strong enough to challenge the 
president’s authority. In addition to some foreign figures who held powerful 
positions in Niyazov’s inner circle, the top Turkmen elites comprising a narrow 
group of individuals close to the president mostly were members of key state 
security units; for example, the head of the presidential guard, General Akmurad 
Rejepov; Defense Minister Agageldy Mammetgeldyev; Minister of National 
Security Geldimuhammet Asyrmuhammedov; and Akmammet Rahmanov, 
the Minister of the Interior. Although Berdymukhamedov, who later became 
president, was not a major figure in this circle, he provided personal medical 
assistance to Niyazov as his personal dentist, indicating a close affiliation.112
Although Berdymukhamedov’s policy and rule are distinct from those 
of Niyazov, Turkmenistan under Berdymukhamedov remains a highly 
personal-authoritarian regime. In contrast to Niyazov, Berdymukhamedov 
built his own regime on family and regional networks from the western 
Ahal region. In addition, Berdymukhamedov has increased development 
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projects in peripheral areas and has implemented policies that facially appear 
decentralized. Such policies liberalize local governance that benefits local 
elites. For example, local councils are able to elect or impeach their municipal 
governors. Governors have longer tenure, and consequently have more time 
to build informal client networks. Therefore, Berdymukhamedov’s policies 
have promoted neopatrimonialism throughout the country at all levels of 
government.113 Although decentralization has occurred, the political system is 
still highly centralized, and President Berdumukhamedov remains the ultimate 
authority. As Berdumukhamedov’s power becomes more substantial, stable, 
and consolidated, he may reverse his decentralization policies and reconstruct 
the highly centralized system of his predecessor.114
A third type of neopatrimonialism exists in Kyrgystan. There, the president 
is incapable of contending with substantial and fierce competition among 
political elites. The result has been the overthrow of regimes in 2005 and 2010. 
Subsequently, reform efforts have attempted to regulate competing forces. 
Since gaining independence in 1991, multiple networks based on political 
and economic interests and regional identity have caused fierce political 
competition in Kyrgyzstan. However, a loosely regulated market economy 
introduced by former president Akayev produced a group of powerful and 
ambitious oligarchs who simultaneously grasp for commercial and political 
advantages. These networks of elites include family members of both Akayev 
and his successor, Bakiyev. Uncontrolled oligarchs and family networks of 
the two presidents have drawn criticism that they “privatized the country.”115 
Opponents of the regime thus fight for both political power and access to 
economic resources.
Political development in Kyrgyzstan demonstrates how political elites 
have mobilized through the patronage networks to bargain for the best deal, 
or to form a strong opposition to combat the ruling regime.116 When the ruler 
cannot afford to coordinate, balance, or even suppress these competitive 
networks, he faces regime subversion. The regime changes in 2005 and 2010 
were mainly instigated by oppositional elites who were seeking to protect their 
personal interests or vying for power and access to economic resources.117
The 2010 constitution officially changed the political system by altering 
the balance of power, such that parliament now has greater authority than the 
executive. Additionally, a proportional election system protects parliament 
from the emergence of a powerful propresidential party. A parliamentary 
election was held in October 2010. Five parties were elected to parliament, 
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and a coalition government was subsequently formed by the SDPK, Ar-
Namys, and Ata-Meken, while Ata-Zhurt and Respublika joined forces to 
become the opposition party.118 The second parliamentary elections were 
held in Kyrgyzstan on October 4, 2015; six parties gained seats in parliament: 
SDPK won thirty-eight seats; Respublika-Ata-Zhurt won twenty-eight seats; 
Kyrgyzstan Party, eighteen seats; Onuguu-Progress, thirteen seats; Bir Bol, 
twelve seats; and the Ata Meken Socialist Party, eleven seats.119
Through the new constitution, formal institutions such as free elections 
and debate in parliament have transformed informal institutions. Additionally, 
the possibility of another violent regime subversion is reduced. However, 
the constitution also leads to the fragile and fragmented multiparty system 
in Kyrgyzstan. There are more than one hundred registered political parties, 
which are continually in the processes of transformation or reorganization, 
unification, or disintegration.120 The fragmentation of parties follows political, 
social, regional, and economic cleavages.121 Consequently, while formal rules 
have transformed and directed neopatrimonial politics, patronage networks 
have developed in Kyrgyz parliamentarianism. Through these patronage 
networks, parties attempt to acquire political resources.122 As a result, real 
policy programs are a secondary priority. Additionally, oligarchs have taken 
a new form as party members and wield influence in various areas such 
as business, media, culture, and science, all of which are involved in the 
election process. Moreover, the presence of patronage networks is revealed 
in the funding of political parties.123 Because the relevant statutory provisions 
regarding party “membership fees” are neither strict nor clear, it is likely that 
corruption and money politics within parties will arise.124
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Conclusion
Compared with other post-Soviet countries, particularly those in Eastern 
Europe, political transition in Central Asian states has evinced the growing 
concerns about the collapse of democracy and resurgence of authoritarianism. 
Democratic development is below expectations. Political transition in Central 
Asia is a pattern of passive institutional design in which policymakers do not 
intend to reform institutional frameworks directly, but instead attempt to create 
or adapt institutions according to personal motivations. Because implementing 
desired institutional changes is easier if they are based on and supported by 
the existing institutional context, reforms have been affected greatly by the 
institutional legacies of both the prerevolutionary era and the Soviet regime.
The governance of tsarist colonial authority was indirect and did not 
interfere with societies or the influences of local factions; therefore, local 
identities persisted and many native institutions continued to function. The 
Bolshevik Revolution placed Central Asia under the regime of the Soviet 
Union, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party attempted to 
eliminate the traditional rod and premya system. However, the Soviet system 
failed to do so. The informality of kinship ties and networks rendered them 
difficult for the Soviet state to control and they became more durable through 
the practice of patronage. These institutional legacies of the traditional social 
structure and Soviet system had a continual impact on nation building and 
development after the Central Asian states gained independence. Politics 
in Central Asia are currently defined by the feature of neopatrimonialism, 
in which the authoritarian presidential office is a formal institution, with 
an underlying informal practice of patron-client relationship that acts as a 
dynamic of invisible politics.
Because most Central Asian ruling elites emerged during the Soviet era, 
the effect of a one-party dictatorship system was a source of inspiration. 
Therefore, a vertical structure of power influenced the post-independence 
political power structure. The president is the core of power, and the parliament, 
government, parties, and other organizations act in accordance with the 
implementation of the president’s power. The presidential party and tendency 
toward incumbancy continue to advance in strength and increasingly play a 
role in the consolidation of a president’s power in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Even in Kyrgyzstan, where the development of 
party politics is more active, the support of the SDPK by President Atambayev 
and the October 2015 election results have shown that Atambayev’s role is 
substantial in the political and party spheres. Similar to other Central Asian 
leaders, Atambayev has managed to maintain the balance of interests among 
the main political actors.
Furthermore, the traditional model of paternalism, the ongoing existence of 
rod and premya, and the patron-clientelism of Soviet bureaucracy continue to 
affect state governance in Central Asia. Patronage has played a crucial role in the 
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relationship between the public and elites and between the central government 
and regions, as well as in interethnic relations. By creating and maintaining 
durable ties with key actors at various levels, political and economic advantages 
can be obtained through a network. The patron-clientelism network involves 
not only kinship ties and familial relationships, but also emphasizes loyalty 
based on the exchange of interests. In the process of gaining independence, 
Central Asian countries formed a president-centered governance structure 
dominated by familial influence. As a result, presidents’ families have obtained 
substantial control over state economies and firmly consolidated the power 
of presidential family groups. In addition, political nepotism and corruption 
caused by patron-clientelism have substantially undermined the system of 
government and become a source of political instability.
It has been more than twenty years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
and political transition from the Soviet system to the presidential system, or 
semi-presidential system, is still occurring in Central Asia. However, reforms 
favored in the development of democracy, such as a multiparty system, direct 
elections, and the separation of powers, have been merely superficial works 
in Central Asia. As such, from the perspective of democratic development or 
democratic consolidation, political transition is not yet complete.
